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Voter Conformism and Inefficient Policies
Language
EN
Article de revue
This item was published in
Social Choice and Welfare. 2019-01-01
English Abstract
We study the efficiency of policies when some voters are conformists who like being on the winner's side and when policies signal information. A reelection-seeking incumbent has private and fully informative information ...Read more >
We study the efficiency of policies when some voters are conformists who like being on the winner's side and when policies signal information. A reelection-seeking incumbent has private and fully informative information on both her ability and the quality of her policy. Repealing a policy signals a mistake, which downgrades her perceived ability and may thus cause inefficient policy persistence. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters' perceptions, yet we identify a `conformism advantage' for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. We contrast an efficient equilibrium with an inefficient, pooling, one . Strong conformism makes pandering less likely, and may even eliminate it. Nonzero weak conformism can however deteriorate welfare and increase pandering, but paradoxically only when the incumbent is `altruistic' and values social welfare even when not in power.Read less <
English Keywords
conformity
pandering
incumbency advantage
signaling
