Voter Conformism and Inefficient Policies
| dc.rights.license | open | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | DING, Huihui | |
| hal.structure.identifier | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA] | |
| dc.contributor.author | AUBERT, Cecile
IDREF: 07594717X | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-29T13:25:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-08-29T13:25:44Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-01-01 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | oai:crossref.org:10.1007/s00355-022-01391-w | |
| dc.identifier.uri | oai:crossref.org:10.2139/ssrn.3359166 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/140616 | |
| dc.description.abstractEn | We study the efficiency of policies when some voters are conformists who like being on the winner's side and when policies signal information. A reelection-seeking incumbent has private and fully informative information on both her ability and the quality of her policy. Repealing a policy signals a mistake, which downgrades her perceived ability and may thus cause inefficient policy persistence. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters' perceptions, yet we identify a `conformism advantage' for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. We contrast an efficient equilibrium with an inefficient, pooling, one . Strong conformism makes pandering less likely, and may even eliminate it. Nonzero weak conformism can however deteriorate welfare and increase pandering, but paradoxically only when the incumbent is `altruistic' and values social welfare even when not in power. | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
| dc.source | crossref | |
| dc.subject.en | conformity | |
| dc.subject.en | pandering | |
| dc.subject.en | incumbency advantage | |
| dc.subject.en | signaling | |
| dc.title.en | Voter Conformism and Inefficient Policies | |
| dc.type | Article de revue | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.2139/ssrn.3359166 | en_US |
| dc.subject.hal | Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin] | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design | en_US |
| bordeaux.journal | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
| bordeaux.hal.laboratories | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113 | en_US |
| bordeaux.institution | Université de Bordeaux | en_US |
| bordeaux.institution | CNRS | en_US |
| bordeaux.peerReviewed | oui | en_US |
| bordeaux.inpress | non | en_US |
| bordeaux.import.source | dissemin | |
| hal.export | false | |
| workflow.import.source | dissemin | |
| dc.rights.cc | Pas de Licence CC | en_US |
| bordeaux.COinS | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Social%20Choice%20and%20Welfare&rft.date=2019-01-01&rft.eissn=0176-1714&rft.issn=0176-1714&rft.au=DING,%20Huihui&AUBERT,%20Cecile&rft.genre=article |
