DING, Huihui; AUBERT, Cecile

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3359166

Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]

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Social Choice and Welfare. 2019-01-01

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We study the efficiency of policies when some voters are conformists who like being on the winner's side and when policies signal information. A reelection-seeking incumbent has private and fully informative information on both her ability and the quality of her policy. Repealing a policy signals a mistake, which downgrades her perceived ability and may thus cause inefficient policy persistence. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters' perceptions, yet we identify a `conformism advantage' for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. We contrast an efficient equilibrium with an inefficient, pooling, one . Strong conformism makes pandering less likely, and may even eliminate it. Nonzero weak conformism can however deteriorate welfare and increase pandering, but paradoxically only when the incumbent is `altruistic' and values social welfare even when not in power.< Réduire

Mots clés en anglais

conformity

pandering

incumbency advantage

signaling

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https://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/140616

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http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359166

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Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113

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Voter Conformism and Inefficient Policies

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