Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
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EN
Article de revue
Este ítem está publicado en
Economics Letters. 2015, vol. 137, p. 50-53
Resumen en inglés
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining ...Leer más >
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.< Leer menos
Palabras clave en inglés
Equal bargaining power
Farsighted players
Stability
Centros de investigación