Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
Langue
EN
Article de revue
Ce document a été publié dans
Economics Letters. 2015, vol. 137, p. 50-53
Résumé en anglais
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining ...Lire la suite >
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.< Réduire
Mots clés en anglais
Equal bargaining power
Farsighted players
Stability
Unités de recherche