Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
Language
EN
Article de revue
This item was published in
Economics Letters. 2015, vol. 137, p. 50-53
English Abstract
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining ...Read more >
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.Read less <
English Keywords
Equal bargaining power
Farsighted players
Stability