Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project
Language
EN
Article de revue
This item was published in
International Game Theory Review. 2018, vol. 20, n° 3
English Abstract
We consider a dynamic contribution game in which a group of agents collaborates to complete a public project. The agents exert efforts over time and get rewarded upon completion of the project, once the cumulative effort ...Read more >
We consider a dynamic contribution game in which a group of agents collaborates to complete a public project. The agents exert efforts over time and get rewarded upon completion of the project, once the cumulative effort has reached a pre-specified level. We explicitly derive the cooperative solution and a noncooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of socially efficient projects, i.e., projects that cooperative groups find worth completing. Comparing with the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, we find that noncooperative groups give up large socially efficient projects. Moreover, they take too much time to complete the projects that they undertake.Read less <
English Keywords
Differential Games
Free-Riding
Procrastination
Voluntary Contribution Games