The Deleuzian approach to the status, validity and use of the notions of form and matter in the history of philosophy is a critical one. A large part of his thought constitutes indeed a radical alternative to the classical way in which Western philosophy has thematized the individual as a composite of form and matter. For instance, one of the main interest of Deleuze in Difference and repetition is to explore a certain process of individuation that precedes de jure form and matter as individuating factors. In this regard, instead of the so-called hylomorphic scheme — whether it be its Aristotelian version (hulē)/morphē or eidos) or its Kantian derivation in the a priori forms of understanding and the material content of sense data —, Deleuze will try to establish a field of « fluid intensive factors, which no more take the form of an I than of a Self » to account for the genesis and nature of the individual (Deleuze, 1994, p. 152). At the heart of this alternative a certain conceptual logic will be key, namely, that of intensity. First introduced as the conceptual operator of an « asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible » in Difference and repetition, intensity will open up the way to a reflection on the cinematic and affective modulations that define a new vision of the individual, a vision based on the consideration of the multiplicity of movements, speeds, affects and forces that permeate precisely between form and matter. Although the onto-logical ramifications of intensity are mainly developed in works such as Difference and repetition or A Thousand Plateaus, little attention has been paid to its aesthetic character and implications, even if, for instance, in Difference and repetition, intensity is already defined as « the object of a violent encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility » (Deleuze, 1994, p. 145). In this sense, the main goal of our communication is to introduce the essential contributions that a consideration of intensity in Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: logique de la sensation (1981) can provide within the contemporary debate on the notions of form and matter, and concomitantly, on the question of the nature and status of the individual.Read less <