DUPONT, Régis; ENGE, Andreas

Metadatos

Licencia de uso del documento

DUPONT, Régis
Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau] [LIX]
Algorithmic number theory for cryptology [TANC]

ENGE, Andreas
Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau] [LIX]
Algorithmic number theory for cryptology [TANC]

Idioma

Article de revue

Este ítem está publicado en

Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2006, vol. 154, n° 2, p. 270-276

Elsevier

Resumen en inglés

We define a security notion for non-interactive key distribution protocols. We identify an apparently hard computational problem related to pairings, the Bilinear Diffie--Hellman problem (BDH). After extending Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara's pairing based protocol to a slightly more general setting, we show that breaking the system is polynomially equivalent to solving BDH in the random oracle model and thus establish a security proof.< Leer menos

Palabras clave en inglés

key distribution

non-interactive

identity based cryptography

pairings

security proof

random oracle model

Orígen

Importado de Hal

Centros de investigación

Institut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux (IMB) - UMR 5251