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Philosophy in Science: Can Philosophers of Science Permeate through Science and Produce Scientific Knowledge?
PRADEU, Thomas
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
LEMOINE, Maël
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
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Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
PRADEU, Thomas
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
LEMOINE, Maël
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
< Réduire
Immunology from Concept and Experiments to Translation = Immunologie Conceptuelle, Expérimentale et Translationnelle [ImmunoConcept]
Langue
EN
Article de revue
Ce document a été publié dans
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2024-06, vol. 75, n° 2, p. 375 – 416
Résumé en anglais
Most philosophers of science do philosophy ‘on’ science. By contrast, others do philosophy ‘in’ science (PinS), that is, they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful ...Lire la suite >
Most philosophers of science do philosophy ‘on’ science. By contrast, others do philosophy ‘in’ science (PinS), that is, they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful proposals. Here, we consider the evidence in favour of a trend of this nature. We proceed in two stages. First, we identify relevant authors and articles empirically with bibliometric tools, given that PinS would be likely to infiltrate science and thus to be published in scientific journals (‘intervention’), cited in scientific journals (‘visibility’), and sometimes rec-ognized as a scientific result by scientists (‘contribution’). We show that many central figures in philosophy of science have been involved in PinS, and that some philosophers have even ‘spe-cialized’ in this practice. Second, we propose a conceptual definition of PinS as a process involv-ing three conditions (raising a scientific problem, using philosophical tools to address it, and making a scientific proposal), and we ask whether the articles identified at the first stage fulfil all these conditions. We show that PinS is a distinctive, quantitatively substantial trend within philosophy of science, demonstrating the existence of a methodological continuity from science to philosophy of science< Réduire
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