Factoring pq 2 with Quadratic Forms: Nice Cryptanalyses
JOUX, Antoine
Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation [PRISM]
Délégation générale de l'armement [DGA]
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Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation [PRISM]
Délégation générale de l'armement [DGA]
JOUX, Antoine
Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation [PRISM]
Délégation générale de l'armement [DGA]
Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation [PRISM]
Délégation générale de l'armement [DGA]
NGUYEN, Phong Q.
Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure [LIENS]
Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities [CASCADE]
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Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure [LIENS]
Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities [CASCADE]
Langue
en
Communication dans un congrès
Ce document a été publié dans
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2009, 2009-12-06, Tokyo. 2009p. 469 - 486
Résumé en anglais
We present a new algorithm based on binary quadratic forms to factor integers of the form N = pq 2 . Its heuristic running time is expo-nential in the general case, but becomes polynomial when special (arith-metic) hints ...Lire la suite >
We present a new algorithm based on binary quadratic forms to factor integers of the form N = pq 2 . Its heuristic running time is expo-nential in the general case, but becomes polynomial when special (arith-metic) hints are available, which is exactly the case for the so-called NICE family of public-key cryptosystems based on quadratic fields introduced in the late 90s. Such cryptosystems come in two flavours, depending on whether the quadratic field is imaginary or real. Our factoring al-gorithm yields a general key-recovery polynomial-time attack on NICE, which works for both versions: Castagnos and Laguillaumie recently ob-tained a total break of imaginary-NICE, but their attack could not apply to real-NICE. Our algorithm is rather different from classical factoring algorithms: it combines Lagrange's reduction of quadratic forms with a provable variant of Coppersmith's lattice-based root finding algorithm for homogeneous polynomials. It is very efficient given either of the following arithmetic hints: the public key of imaginary-NICE, which provides an alternative to the CL attack; or the knowledge that the regulator of the quadratic field Q(√ p) is unusually small, just like in real-NICE.< Réduire
Mots clés en anglais
Public-key Cryptanalysis
Factorisation
Binary Quadratic Forms
Homogeneous Coppersmith's Root Finding
Lattices
Origine
Importé de halUnités de recherche