MAGNI BERTON, Raul; PANEL, Sophie

doi:10.1177/1065912918775251

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MAGNI BERTON, Raul
Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales [PACTE]
Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble [IEPG]

PANEL, Sophie
Centre Émile Durkheim [CED]

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Ce document a été publié dans

Political Research Quarterly. 2018-03-22, vol. 71, n° 4, p. 975-988

SAGE Publications (UK and US)

Résumé en anglais

According to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader’s age decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes.< Réduire

Mots clés en anglais

political leaders

dictatorship

intrastate conflict

democracy

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Alternation through Death: Is Gerontocracy an Equilibrium?

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