Alternation through Death: Is Gerontocracy an Equilibrium?
MAGNI BERTON, Raul
Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales [PACTE]
Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble [IEPG]
Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales [PACTE]
Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble [IEPG]
MAGNI BERTON, Raul
Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales [PACTE]
Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble [IEPG]
< Reduce
Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales [PACTE]
Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble [IEPG]
Language
en
Article de revue
This item was published in
Political Research Quarterly. 2018-03-22, vol. 71, n° 4, p. 975-988
SAGE Publications (UK and US)
English Abstract
According to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to ...Read more >
According to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader’s age decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes.Read less <
English Keywords
political leaders
dictatorship
intrastate conflict
democracy
Origin
Hal imported