The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition
BROUARD, Sylvain
Science Politique Relations Internationales Territoire [SPIRIT]
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP]
Science Politique Relations Internationales Territoire [SPIRIT]
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP]
BROUARD, Sylvain
Science Politique Relations Internationales Territoire [SPIRIT]
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP]
< Leer menos
Science Politique Relations Internationales Territoire [SPIRIT]
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP]
Idioma
en
Article de revue
Este ítem está publicado en
West European Politics. 2009, vol. 32, n° 2(France's Political Institutions at 50), p. 384-403
Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Resumen en inglés
This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support ...Leer más >
This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support existing theories of veto politics. Therefore, the article develops an electoral theory of veto politics. It emphasises the fact that the incentives generated by electoral competition shape the signalling game between legislative majority, legislative minority and the Constitutional Council. The structure of this game fuels a high level of vetoes and explains the pattern of vetoing in France.< Leer menos
Palabras clave en inglés
France
politics
power
organization
Political Institutions
Fifth Republic
Constitutional Council
veto
Orígen
Importado de HalCentros de investigación