UÇAN, Timur

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UÇAN, Timur
Sciences, Philosophie, Humanités [SPH]

Langue

Chapitre d'ouvrage

Ce document a été publié dans

44th International Wittgenstein Symposium: 100 Years Tractatus, 44th International Wittgenstein Symposium: 100 Years Tractatus. 2023

De Gruyter

Date de soutenance

2023

Résumé en anglais

This paper consists in a comparative study of the notions of negative fact in the early works of Russell and Wittgenstein. How to account for our ability to think both that it is false that what is not the case is the case and incorrect to think that it is true that what is not the case is the case? Are the truth and the correctness of such thoughts and of their expressions meant to be insured by the existence of negative facts? Or do we need to think of negative facts differently? In his early works, Russell argues not only that negative facts exist, but also that the philosophical problem they suffice to solve is real. While in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein dissolves the philosophical problem by letting the superfluity and misleadingness of the affirmation of the existence of negative facts be seen as such.< Réduire

Mots clés en anglais

Bertrand Russell

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Negative fact

Origine

Importé de hal

Unités de recherche

Sciences, Philosophie, Humanités (SPH) - UMRU 4573