Since 2003 and the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish diplomacy has moved from a conservative (or Realpolitik) doctrine of foreign policy (sovereignty and security as priorities, the doctrine of 'balance of power', the use of military force being possible in cases where other democracies would negotiate) to a more liberal policy (trade, including cultural goods, as a priority; negotiations with all the neighbours to meet the targets of the 'Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors'; the use of cultural and/or religious proximity with certain countries to increase trade and influence). The Turkish case is interesting because the Realpolitik doctrine was implemented for decades by politicians and diplomats concerned with the idea of 'modernization', i.e.making Turkey a 'normal' European country with a 'normal' foreign policy according to the dominant Western European conception of international relations. How far is such a move to a different doctrine possible? Under which conditions is it possible? What could the consequences be, and what kind of consequences would be acceptable?What could the internal and external purposes be in fine? 'National issues' such as Turkey's rivalry with Greece on the Aegean, the Cypriot and Kurdish questions obviously slow down the transition because of the internal resistance fromthe military, the diplomats, and the political parties (in power or in opposition). External factors such as the hostility to the Turkish candidacy for EUmembership in theWest European political elite and public opinion, the Arab revolutions or the Iranian nuclear crisis forced the AKP government to adapt, to adjust and to take risks it was not ready to take at the beginning of the process.< Réduire