Afficher la notice abrégée

Bandwidth-Efficient Threshold EC-DSA

hal.structure.identifierLithe and fast algorithmic number theory [LFANT]
dc.contributor.authorCASTAGNOS, Guilhem
hal.structure.identifierDipartimento di Matematica e Informatica [DMI]
dc.contributor.authorCATALANO, Dario
hal.structure.identifierArithmetic and Computing [ARIC]
dc.contributor.authorLAGUILLAUMIE, Fabien
hal.structure.identifierDipartimento di Matematica e Informatica [DMI]
hal.structure.identifierScuola Superiore di Catania
dc.contributor.authorSAVASTA, Federico
hal.structure.identifierArithmetic and Computing [ARIC]
dc.contributor.authorTUCKER, Ida
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-04T02:49:40Z
dc.date.available2024-04-04T02:49:40Z
dc.date.issued2020-04-29
dc.date.conference2020-06-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/191841
dc.description.abstractEnThreshold Signatures allow n parties to share the power of issuing digital signatures so that any coalition of size at least t+1 can sign, whereas groups of t or less players cannot. Over the last few years many schemes addressed the question of realizing efficient threshold variants for the specific case of EC-DSA signatures. In this paper we present new solutions to the problem that aim at reducing the overall bandwidth consumption. Our main contribution is a new variant of the Gennaro and Goldfeder protocol from ACM CCS 2018 that avoids all the required range proofs, while retaining provable security against malicious adversaries in the dishonest majority setting. Our experiments show that-for all levels of security-our signing protocol reduces the bandwidth consumption of best previously known secure protocols for factors varying between 4.4 and 9, while key generation is consistently two times less expensive. Furthermore compared to these same protocols, our signature generation is faster for 192-bits of security and beyond.
dc.description.sponsorshipAppLicAtions de la MalléaBIlité en Cryptographie - ANR-16-CE39-0006
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing
dc.title.enBandwidth-Efficient Threshold EC-DSA
dc.typeCommunication dans un congrès
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_10
dc.subject.halInformatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
bordeaux.page266-296
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesInstitut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux (IMB) - UMR 5251*
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeaux
bordeaux.institutionBordeaux INP
bordeaux.institutionCNRS
bordeaux.conference.titlePKC 2020 - 23rd IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography
bordeaux.countryGB
bordeaux.conference.cityEdinburgh / Virtual
bordeaux.peerReviewedoui
hal.identifierhal-02944825
hal.version1
hal.invitednon
hal.proceedingsoui
hal.conference.end2020-06-04
hal.popularnon
hal.audienceInternationale
hal.origin.linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-02944825v1
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.date=2020-04-29&rft.spage=266-296&rft.epage=266-296&rft.au=CASTAGNOS,%20Guilhem&CATALANO,%20Dario&LAGUILLAUMIE,%20Fabien&SAVASTA,%20Federico&TUCKER,%20Ida&rft.genre=unknown


Fichier(s) constituant ce document

FichiersTailleFormatVue

Il n'y a pas de fichiers associés à ce document.

Ce document figure dans la(les) collection(s) suivante(s)

Afficher la notice abrégée