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A Direct Key Recovery Attack on SIDH

hal.structure.identifierUniversity of Bristol [Bristol]
dc.contributor.authorMAINO, Luciano
hal.structure.identifierUniversity of Bristol [Bristol]
dc.contributor.authorMARTINDALE, Chloe
hal.structure.identifierAcademia Sinica
dc.contributor.authorPANNY, Lorenz
hal.structure.identifierNCC Group
hal.structure.identifierUniversity of Bristol [Bristol]
dc.contributor.authorPOPE, Giacomo
hal.structure.identifierCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique [CNRS]
hal.structure.identifierLithe and fast algorithmic number theory [LFANT]
hal.structure.identifierUnité de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées [UMPA-ENSL]
hal.structure.identifierAnalyse cryptographique et arithmétique [CANARI]
dc.contributor.authorWESOLOWSKI, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-04T02:35:23Z
dc.date.available2024-04-04T02:35:23Z
dc.date.issued2023-04-16
dc.date.conference2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/190633
dc.description.abstractEnWe present an attack on SIDH utilising isogenies between polarized products of two supersingular elliptic curves. In the case of arbitrary starting curve, our attack (discovered independently from [8]) has subexponential complexity, thus significantly reducing the security of SIDH and SIKE. When the endomorphism ring of the starting curve is known, our attack (here derived from [8]) has polynomial-time complexity assuming the generalised Riemann hypothesis. Our attack applies to any isogeny-based cryptosystem that publishes the images of points under the secret isogeny, for example Séta and B-SIDH. It does not apply to CSIDH, CSI-FiSh, or SQISign.
dc.description.sponsorshipMéthodes pour les variétés abéliennes de petite dimension - ANR-20-CE40-0013
dc.description.sponsorshipPost-quantum padlock for web browser - ANR-22-PETQ-0008
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Nature Switzerland
dc.publisherSpringer Nature Switzerland
dc.publisher.locationCham
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
dc.subject.enSIDH
dc.subject.enElliptic curve
dc.subject.enIsogeny
dc.subject.enCryptanalysis
dc.title.enA Direct Key Recovery Attack on SIDH
dc.typeCommunication dans un congrès
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_16
dc.subject.halInformatique [cs]
dc.subject.halMathématiques [math]
bordeaux.page448-471
bordeaux.volume14008
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesInstitut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux (IMB) - UMR 5251*
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeaux
bordeaux.institutionBordeaux INP
bordeaux.institutionCNRS
bordeaux.conference.titleAdvances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023
bordeaux.countryFR
bordeaux.conference.cityLyon
bordeaux.peerReviewedoui
hal.identifierhal-04023441
hal.version1
hal.invitednon
hal.proceedingsoui
hal.popularnon
hal.audienceInternationale
hal.origin.linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-04023441v1
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