Political connections, political favoritism and political competition: evidence from the granting of building permits by French mayors
| dc.rights.license | open | en_US |
| hal.structure.identifier | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA] | |
| dc.contributor.author | LEVEQUE, Christophe | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-03-03T15:12:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-03-03T15:12:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-09-18 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0048-5829 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | oai:crossref.org:10.1007/s11127-019-00718-z | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/3683 | |
| dc.description.abstractEn | This article discusses the influence of political connections on public policies implemented at the local level. Using a sample of more than 189,000 local politicians in French cities with more than 3500 inhabitants, I examine whether families of candidates who supported the mayors elected in 2008 obtain more building permits than the families of their political opponents. I find that the former obtain 35% more building permits than the latter between 2008 and 2014. Then, I show that the previous difference declines with political competition and disappears after close elections. My interpretation of those findings underlines two mechanisms. First, political competition disciplines mayors: in cities with weak political competition, mayors may favor their supporters when these supporters or one of their family members wants to obtain building permits, but they refrain from doing so after close elections. Second, in these cities, individuals who want to obtain something in exchange for their support (such as facilitating the acquisition of building permits) may easily forecast who is likely to become the mayor and whom they should support. | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
| dc.source | crossref | |
| dc.subject.en | Political favoritism | |
| dc.subject.en | Local elections | |
| dc.subject.en | Building permits | |
| dc.subject.en | Mayors | |
| dc.subject.en | Housing supply | |
| dc.title.en | Political connections, political favoritism and political competition: evidence from the granting of building permits by French mayors | |
| dc.type | Article de revue | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11127-019-00718-z | en_US |
| dc.subject.hal | Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin] | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics::R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location::R31 - Housing Supply and Markets | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics::R5 - Regional Government Analysis::R50 - General | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption | en_US |
| bordeaux.journal | Public Choice | en_US |
| bordeaux.hal.laboratories | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113 | en_US |
| bordeaux.institution | Université de Bordeaux | en_US |
| bordeaux.peerReviewed | oui | en_US |
| bordeaux.inpress | non | en_US |
| bordeaux.import.source | dissemin | |
| hal.identifier | hal-02497408 | |
| hal.version | 1 | |
| hal.date.transferred | 2020-03-03T15:13:00Z | |
| hal.export | true | |
| workflow.import.source | dissemin | |
| bordeaux.COinS | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Public%20Choice&rft.date=2019-09-18&rft.eissn=0048-5829&rft.issn=0048-5829&rft.au=LEVEQUE,%20Christophe&rft.genre=article |
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