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Two-Party ECDSA from Hash Proof Systems and Efficient Instantiations

hal.structure.identifierLithe and fast algorithmic number theory [LFANT]
dc.contributor.authorCASTAGNOS, Guilhem
hal.structure.identifierDipartimento di Matematica e Informatica [DMI]
dc.contributor.authorCATALANO, Dario
hal.structure.identifierArithmetic and Computing [ARIC]
dc.contributor.authorLAGUILLAUMIE, Fabien
hal.structure.identifierUniversità degli studi di Catania = University of Catania [Unict]
dc.contributor.authorSAVASTA, Federico
hal.structure.identifierArithmetic and Computing [ARIC]
dc.contributor.authorTUCKER, Ida
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-04T02:59:57Z
dc.date.available2024-04-04T02:59:57Z
dc.date.issued2019-08-01
dc.date.conference2019-08-18
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/192784
dc.description.abstractEnECDSA is a widely adopted digital signature standard. Unfortunately, efficient distributed variants of this primitive are notoriously hard to achieve and known solutions often require expensive zero knowledge proofs to deal with malicious adversaries. For the two party case, Lindell [Lin17] recently managed to get an efficient solution which, to achieve simulation-based security, relies on an interactive, non standard, assumption on Paillier’s cryptosystem. In this paper we generalize Lindell’s solution using hash proof systems. The main advantage of our generic method is that it results in a simulation-based security proof without resorting to non-standard interactive assumptions. Moving to concrete constructions, we show how to instantiate our framework using class groups of imaginary quadratic fields. Our implementations show that the practical impact of dropping such interactive assumptions is minimal. Indeed, while for 128-bit security our scheme is marginally slower than Lindell’s, for 256-bit security it turns out to be better both in key generation and signing time. Moreover, in terms of communication cost, our implementation significantly reduces both the number of rounds and the transmitted bits without exception.
dc.description.sponsorshipAppLicAtions de la MalléaBIlité en Cryptographie - ANR-16-CE39-0006
dc.language.isoen
dc.title.enTwo-Party ECDSA from Hash Proof Systems and Efficient Instantiations
dc.typeCommunication dans un congrès
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_7
dc.subject.halInformatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
bordeaux.page191-221
bordeaux.volumeLNCS
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesInstitut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux (IMB) - UMR 5251*
bordeaux.issue11694
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeaux
bordeaux.institutionBordeaux INP
bordeaux.institutionCNRS
bordeaux.conference.titleCRYPTO 2019 - 39th Annual International Cryptology Conference
bordeaux.countryUS
bordeaux.conference.citySanta Barbara
bordeaux.peerReviewedoui
hal.identifierhal-02281931
hal.version1
hal.invitednon
hal.proceedingsoui
hal.conference.end2019-08-22
hal.popularnon
hal.audienceInternationale
hal.origin.linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-02281931v1
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.date=2019-08-01&rft.volume=LNCS&rft.issue=11694&rft.spage=191-221&rft.epage=191-221&rft.au=CASTAGNOS,%20Guilhem&CATALANO,%20Dario&LAGUILLAUMIE,%20Fabien&SAVASTA,%20Federico&TUCKER,%20Ida&rft.genre=unknown


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