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Horizontal Correlation Analysis on Exponentiation

hal.structure.identifierDMI
dc.contributor.authorCLAVIER, Christophe
hal.structure.identifierINSIDE CONTACTLESS
dc.contributor.authorFEIX, Benoit
hal.structure.identifierDMI
dc.contributor.authorGAGNEROT, Georges
hal.structure.identifierINSIDE CONTACTLESS
dc.contributor.authorROUSSELLET, Mylène
hal.structure.identifierLithe and fast algorithmic number theory [LFANT]
dc.contributor.authorVERNEUIL, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-04T02:56:30Z
dc.date.available2024-04-04T02:56:30Z
dc.date.issued2010-07-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/192469
dc.description.abstractEnPower Analysis has been widely studied since Kocher et al. presented in 1998 the initial Simple and Differential Power Analysis (SPA and DPA). Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) is nowadays one of the most powerful techniques which requires, as classical DPA, many execution curves for recovering secrets. We introduce in this paper a technique in which we apply correlation analysis using only one execution power curve during an exponentiation to recover the whole secret exponent manipulated by the chip. As in the Big Mac attack from Walter, longer keys may facilitate this analysis and success will depend on the arithmetic coprocessor characteristics. We present the theory of the attack with some practical successful results on an embedded device and analyze the efficiency of classical countermeasures with respect to our attack. Our technique, which uses a single exponentiation curve, cannot be prevented by exponent blinding. Also, contrarily to the Big Mac attack, it applies even in the case of regular implementations such as the square and multiply always or the Montgomery ladder. We also point out that DSA and Diffie-Hellman exponentiations are no longer immune against CPA. Then we discuss the efficiency of known countermeasures, and we finally present some new ones.
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject.enPublic Key Cryptography
dc.subject.enSide-Channel Analysis
dc.subject.enHorizontal and Vertical Power Analysis
dc.subject.enExponentiation
dc.subject.enArithmetic Coprocessors
dc.title.enHorizontal Correlation Analysis on Exponentiation
dc.typeRapport
dc.subject.halInformatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesInstitut de Mathématiques de Bordeaux (IMB) - UMR 5251*
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeaux
bordeaux.institutionBordeaux INP
bordeaux.institutionCNRS
bordeaux.type.institutionIACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
bordeaux.type.reportrr
hal.identifierhal-02486982
hal.version1
hal.origin.linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-02486982v1
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.date=2010-07-12&rft.au=CLAVIER,%20Christophe&FEIX,%20Benoit&GAGNEROT,%20Georges&ROUSSELLET,%20Myl%C3%A8ne&VERNEUIL,%20Vincent&rft.genre=unknown


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