‘Policy Externalisation’ Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions’ Conditionality in Developing Countries
| hal.structure.identifier | EconomiX [EconomiX] | |
| dc.contributor.author | SINDZINGRE, Alice Nicole | |
| dc.date.conference | 2015 | |
| dc.description.abstractEn | Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an asymmetrical relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central mechanisms of the reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs). As they are imposed by outside entities, they can also be viewed as ‘policy externalisation’, which is paradoxically a massive intrusion in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies. The resilience of such devices is remarkable, however. Indeed, in the early 1980s, many developing countries were facing balance of payments difficulties and called upon these international financial institutions for financial relief. In exchange for this relief, they devised economic reforms (fiscal, financial, monetary), which were the conditions for their lending. These reforms were not associated with better economic performance, and this led the IFIs to devise in the 1990s different reforms, which this time targeted the functioning of the government and its ‘governance’, economic problems being explained by governments’ characteristics (e.g., rent-seekers). The paper demonstrates the limitations of the device of conditionality, which is a crucial theoretical and policy issue given its stability across time and countries. These limitations stem from: i) the concept of conditionality per se - the mechanism of exchanging finance for reform; ii) the contents of the prescribed reforms given developing countries economic structure (typically commodity-based export structures) and the weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in view of these countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in particular regarding effectiveness and credibility. | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject.en | Conditionality | |
| dc.subject.en | conditional lending | |
| dc.subject.en | International Financial Institutions | |
| dc.subject.en | developing countries | |
| dc.title.en | ‘Policy Externalisation’ Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions’ Conditionality in Developing Countries | |
| dc.type | Communication dans un congrès | |
| dc.subject.hal | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances | |
| bordeaux.country | ZZ | |
| bordeaux.conference.city | Lyon | |
| bordeaux.peerReviewed | oui | |
| hal.identifier | hal-01668363 | |
| hal.version | 1 | |
| hal.invited | non | |
| hal.proceedings | non | |
| hal.popular | non | |
| hal.audience | Non spécifiée | |
| hal.origin.link | https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr//hal-01668363v1 | |
| bordeaux.COinS | ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.au=SINDZINGRE,%20Alice%20Nicole&rft.genre=unknown |
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