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dc.rights.licenseopenen_US
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]
dc.contributor.authorCARAYOL, Nicolas
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]
dc.contributor.authorSTERZI, Valerio
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-17T15:35:36Z
dc.date.available2021-11-17T15:35:36Z
dc.date.issued2021-02
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/123847
dc.description.abstractEnAlthough the transfer of professors' inventions is typically performed by an intermediary set up by the university (the technology transfer office), other forms of transfer do coexist in reality. To clarify this situation and its consequences, we develop a model that endogenizes a professor's decision regarding the form of transfer for her invention in which intermediation by the transfer office is only one of two options, the other one being a transfer carried out by the professor herself. The intermediary can reach more potential licensees of the invention, whereas the professor is usually better at mitigating information asymmetry through signaling. In the semiseparating equilibrium of the game, promising technologies are likely to be cherry-picked and transferred by the professor. This prediction that the transfer mode is influenced by invention quality is tested and confirmed, as are several other predictions, on our sample of 446 UK academic inventors. Specific care is taken to control for other mechanisms of IP assignment, such as those derived from consulting and sponsored research. Insights in terms of policy are drawn from this new perspective focusing on alternative transfer channels, match quality, and information asymmetry rather than on moral hazard. © 2021 Wiley Periodicals LLC
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.title.enThe transfer and value of academic inventions when the TTO is one option
dc.typeArticle de revueen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jems.12411en_US
dc.subject.halÉconomie et finance quantitative [q-fin]en_US
bordeaux.journalJournal of Economics and Management Strategyen_US
bordeaux.page338-367en_US
bordeaux.volume30en_US
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113en_US
bordeaux.issue2en_US
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeauxen_US
bordeaux.institutionCNRSen_US
bordeaux.peerReviewedouien_US
bordeaux.inpressnonen_US
hal.identifierhal-03433308
hal.version1
hal.date.transferred2021-11-17T15:35:54Z
hal.exporttrue
dc.rights.ccPas de Licence CCen_US
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