Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project
| dc.rights.license | open | en_US |
| hal.structure.identifier | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA] | |
| dc.contributor.author | ROUILLON, Sébastien
IDREF: 149491913 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-20T20:29:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-02-20T20:29:24Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2191989 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/3649 | |
| dc.description.abstractEn | We consider a dynamic contribution game in which a group of agents collaborates to complete a public project. The agents exert efforts over time and get rewarded upon completion of the project, once the cumulative effort has reached a pre-specified level. We explicitly derive the cooperative solution and a noncooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of socially efficient projects, i.e., projects that cooperative groups find worth completing. Comparing with the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, we find that noncooperative groups give up large socially efficient projects. Moreover, they take too much time to complete the projects that they undertake. | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | en_US |
| dc.subject.en | Differential Games | |
| dc.subject.en | Free-Riding | |
| dc.subject.en | Procrastination | |
| dc.subject.en | Voluntary Contribution Games | |
| dc.title.en | Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project | |
| dc.title.alternative | Int. Game Theor. Rev. | en_US |
| dc.type | Article de revue | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1142/S0219198918400029 | en_US |
| dc.subject.hal | Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin] | en_US |
| bordeaux.journal | International Game Theory Review | en_US |
| bordeaux.volume | 20 | en_US |
| bordeaux.hal.laboratories | Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113 | en_US |
| bordeaux.issue | 3 | en_US |
| bordeaux.institution | Université de Bordeaux | en_US |
| bordeaux.peerReviewed | oui | en_US |
| bordeaux.inpress | non | en_US |
| hal.identifier | hal-03116450 | |
| hal.version | 1 | |
| hal.date.transferred | 2021-01-20T11:22:57Z | |
| hal.export | true | |
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