DEFFAINS, B.; ROUILLON, Sébastien

doi:10.3917/redp.281.0041

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DEFFAINS, B.

ROUILLON, Sébastien

Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]

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Revue d'Economie Politique. 2018, vol. 128, n° 1, p. 41-58

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This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.< Leer menos

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Care Level

Disappearing Defendant

Negligence

Punishment Avoidance

Strict Liability

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Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance

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