Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.rights.licenseopenen_US
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]
dc.contributor.authorDOYEN, Luc
IDREF: 058467572
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]
dc.contributor.authorCISSE, Abdoul Ahad
dc.contributor.authorSANZ, N.
dc.contributor.authorBLANCHARD, F.
hal.structure.identifierGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée [GREThA]
dc.contributor.authorPEREAU, Jean-Christophe
IDREF: 086314629
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-19T21:37:33Z
dc.date.available2020-02-19T21:37:33Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn21530785en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/3598
dc.description.abstractEnThis paper investigates the role played by cooperation for the sustainable harvesting of an ecosystem. To achieve this, a bio-economic model based on a multi-species dynamics with interspecific relationships and multi-agent catches is considered. A comparison between the non-cooperative and cooperative optimal strategies is carried out. Revisiting the Tragedy of Open Access and over-exploitation issues, it is first proved analytically how harvesting pressure is larger in the non-cooperative case for every species. Then it is examined to what extent gains from cooperation can also be derived for the state of the ecosystem. It turns out that cooperation clearly promotes the conservation of every species when the number of agents is high. When the number of agents remains limited, results are more complicated, especially if a species-by-species viewpoint is adopted. However, we identify two metrics involving the state of every species and accounting for their ecological interactions which exhibit gains from cooperation at the ecosystem scale in the general case. Numerical examples illustrate the mathematical findings.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.subject.enBiodiversity
dc.subject.enBellman Optimization
dc.subject.enEcosystem
dc.subject.enFish War
dc.subject.enIntermediate Complexity
dc.subject.enMarkov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
dc.title.enThe Tragedy of Open Ecosystems
dc.title.alternativeDyn. Games Appl.en_US
dc.typeArticle de revueen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13235-016-0205-3en_US
dc.subject.halÉconomie et finance quantitative [q-fin]en_US
bordeaux.journalDynamic Games and Applicationsen_US
bordeaux.page117-140en_US
bordeaux.volume8en_US
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesGroupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA) - UMR 5113en_US
bordeaux.issue1en_US
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeauxen_US
bordeaux.peerReviewedouien_US
bordeaux.inpressnonen_US
hal.identifierhal-02485121
hal.version1
hal.date.transferred2020-02-19T21:37:37Z
hal.exporttrue
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Dynamic%20Games%20and%20Applications&rft.date=2018&rft.volume=8&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=117-140&rft.epage=117-140&rft.eissn=21530785&rft.issn=21530785&rft.au=DOYEN,%20Luc&CISSE,%20Abdoul%20Ahad&SANZ,%20N.&BLANCHARD,%20F.&PEREAU,%20Jean-Christophe&rft.genre=article


Archivos en el ítem

ArchivosTamañoFormatoVer

No hay archivos asociados a este ítem.

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem