Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.rights.licenseopenen_US
hal.structure.identifierBordeaux Sciences Economiques [BSE]
dc.contributor.authorPEREAU, Jean-Christophe
IDREF: 086314629
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-16T13:36:34Z
dc.date.available2024-04-16T13:36:34Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-30
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/199110
dc.description.abstractEnThis article aims at modelling compensation between gainers and losers as a system of bilateral bargaining games involving one or two mediators when unanimity is required for the implementation of an economic policy. Results show that there is no unanimity on the choice of negotiation protocol due to the conflicting interests between gainers and losers. But if we assume that the mediators have the choice of the protocol, they always prefer simultaneous rather than stackeberg Nash-in-Nash negotiations.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.subject.enNash-in-Nash negotiation
dc.subject.enNash bargaining solution
dc.subject.enGainers
dc.subject.enLosers
dc.title.enThe role of mediators in compensation negotiations between gainers and losers
dc.typeArticle de revueen_US
dc.subject.halSciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et financesen_US
dc.subject.jelC - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theoryen_US
dc.subject.jelH - Public Economics::H8 - Miscellaneous Issuesen_US
bordeaux.journalEconomics Bulletinen_US
bordeaux.page830-841en_US
bordeaux.volume43en_US
bordeaux.issue2en_US
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeauxen_US
bordeaux.institutionCNRSen_US
bordeaux.institutionINRAEen_US
bordeaux.peerReviewedouien_US
bordeaux.inpressnonen_US
hal.identifierhal-04548608
hal.version1
hal.date.transferred2024-04-16T13:36:35Z
hal.popularnonen_US
hal.audienceInternationaleen_US
hal.exporttrue
dc.rights.ccPas de Licence CCen_US
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Economics%20Bulletin&rft.date=2023-06-30&rft.volume=43&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=830-841&rft.epage=830-841&rft.au=PEREAU,%20Jean-Christophe&rft.genre=article


Archivos en el ítem

Thumbnail

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem