Afficher la notice abrégée

dc.rights.licenseopenen_US
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales [Larefi]
dc.contributor.authorBADARAU, Cristina
dc.contributor.authorHUART, Florence
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales [Larefi]
dc.contributor.authorSANGARÉ, Ibrahima
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-12T11:25:02Z
dc.date.available2022-12-12T11:25:02Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-01
dc.identifier.issn0373-2630en_US
dc.identifier.urioai:crossref.org:10.3917/redp.246.0867
dc.identifier.urihttps://oskar-bordeaux.fr/handle/20.500.12278/170561
dc.description.abstractEnPrime de risque de défaut souverain et orientation divergente des politiques During the euro area (EA) sovereign debt crisis, lenders in financial markets raised default risk premiums on sovereign bonds issued by countries that were then considered too risky. Among some of these countries (especially Greece), fiscal policy had not been implemented according to good practices. In particular, the lack of fiscal discipline stemmed from pro-cyclical public spending. The (over-) reaction of financial markets translated into a sharp increase in the level of long-term interest rates in crisis-hit countries. Consequently, these countries were confronted with severe difficulties in trying to reduce public indebtedness. Moreover, the cost of borrowing for the private sector increased. In this article, we study the effects of asymmetric shocks causing a rise in the sovereign risk premium of one country of a monetary union. We analyze their effects on the domestic country (the one hit by the shock) and the spillovers on the rest of the union (RoU). To do so, we build an open monetary union DSGE model in which member countries are different from one another with regard to the degree of fiscal discipline (pro-cyclical versus counter-cyclical fiscal behaviour). We show that such a model is suitable to explain the mechanisms underlying divergent macroeconomic performance across EA countries after the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.sourcecrossref
dc.subjectopen monetary union
dc.subjectspillover effects
dc.subject.enDSGE
dc.subject.ensovereign risk premium
dc.subject.enpro-cyclical public spending
dc.title.enSovereign Risk Premium and Divergent Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union
dc.typeArticle de revueen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3917/redp.246.0867en_US
dc.subject.halSciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et financesen_US
dc.subject.jelE - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook::E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policyen_US
dc.subject.jelF - International Economics::F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance::F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomicsen_US
bordeaux.journalRevue d'Economie Politiqueen_US
bordeaux.page867-898en_US
bordeaux.volume124en_US
bordeaux.hal.laboratoriesLaboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales (LAREFI) - EA2954en_US
bordeaux.issue6en_US
bordeaux.institutionUniversité de Bordeauxen_US
bordeaux.institutionCNRS
bordeaux.peerReviewedouien_US
bordeaux.inpressnonen_US
bordeaux.import.sourcedissemin
hal.identifierhal-03894545
hal.version1
hal.date.transferred2022-12-12T11:25:04Z
hal.exporttrue
workflow.import.sourcedissemin
dc.rights.ccPas de Licence CCen_US
bordeaux.COinSctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Revue%20d'Economie%20Politique&rft.date=2014-01-01&rft.volume=124&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=867-898&rft.epage=867-898&rft.eissn=0373-2630&rft.issn=0373-2630&rft.au=BADARAU,%20Cristina&HUART,%20Florence&SANGAR%C3%89,%20Ibrahima&rft.genre=article


Fichier(s) constituant ce document

FichiersTailleFormatVue

Il n'y a pas de fichiers associés à ce document.

Ce document figure dans la(les) collection(s) suivante(s)

Afficher la notice abrégée